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A vulnerability classified as problematic was found in Gallagher Command Centre Mobile Client up to 9.40.122 on Android/iOS. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component Session Token Handler. The manipulation results in cleartext storage of sensitive information. This vulnerability is identified as CVE-2025-47147. The attack is only possible with local access. There is not any exploit available. Upgrading the affected component is advised.

好的，用户让我帮忙总结一篇英文文章，控制在100字以内，而且不需要特定的开头。首先，我需要理解文章的内容。看起来这篇文章讲述的是作者在深夜浏览暗网论坛时，偶然发现了一个安全漏洞，并通过自己的好奇心和一些技术手段，成功找到了一个严重的安全问题，最终获得了漏洞赏金。 接下来，我需要提取关键信息：时间、地点、事件、结果。作者是在凌晨两点左右发现的线索，利用威胁情报和侦察技术发现了配置错误的缓存，导致内部敏感数据泄露。结果是一个美丽的漏洞赏金发现。 然后，我要确保总结控制在100字以内，并且直接描述内容，不使用“文章内容总结”之类的开头。所以我会用简洁的语言概括事件的过程和结果。 最后，检查一下有没有遗漏的重要信息，并确保语言流畅自然。 深夜浏览暗网论坛时发现线索,通过威胁情报和侦察技术,利用配置错误的缓存,意外发现内部敏感数据泄露,最终收获人生最美妙的漏洞赏金经历。

在去年发生多起与移动电源相关的飞机起火事故后，日本计划从 4 月中旬起禁止乘客在飞机上使用移动电源/充电宝。日本国土交通省发布了《民用航空条例》修订版征求意见稿。在日本，移动电源被分类为备用电池，被禁止托运。随身行李中的移动电池则禁止超过 160 瓦时，超过 100 瓦时只能携带两块，低于 100 瓦时的不受限制。新修订的规定限制乘客最多能携带包括充电宝在内的两块电池，禁止在机上充电，建议乘客不要使用充电宝。日本航空公司则可能一步到位，直接禁止乘客使用充电宝。

2026年2月28日，美国和以色列对伊朗发起的联合打击行动，离不开精准情报的支撑，尤其是猎杀哈梅内伊等一众高管的定点清除行动，更离不开人力情报、地理空间情报、信号技术情报、网络情报等各类情报工作的高效运用。

重点给大家推荐一个伊朗实时开源情报监测网站-伊朗观察。

Специалисты раскрыли мошенническую сеть Genisys, заразившую 25 миллионов Android-устройств.

嗯，用户让我用中文总结一篇文章，控制在一百字以内，而且不需要特定的开头。首先，我需要理解文章内容。文章讲的是Netflix撤回收购华纳兄弟探索公司的出价，然后派拉蒙天空之舞介入收购了该公司。首席执行官大卫·埃里森宣布合并Paramount+和HBO Max为一个统一平台，并提到他们将投资创意引擎，保持HBO的创意愿景和院线上映计划。 接下来，我要把重点提炼出来：Netflix撤回收购，派拉蒙收购，合并流媒体平台，投资创意，保持HBO不变。然后把这些信息浓缩成一句话，不超过一百字。 可能会这样组织：“Netflix撤回对华纳兄弟探索的收购后，派拉蒙天空之舞完成收购，并计划合并Paramount+与HBO Max为统一平台。CEO埃里森承诺投资创意引擎，并保持HBO的创意愿景和院线上映计划。” 检查一下字数是否在限制内，并且是否涵盖了所有关键点。看起来没问题。 Netflix撤回对华纳兄弟探索的收购后，派拉蒙天空之舞完成收购，并计划合并Paramount+与HBO Max为统一平台。CEO埃里森承诺投资创意引擎，并保持HBO的创意愿景和院线上映计划。

Online security is built through routine decisions made across devices and accounts. People choose how to create passwords, how often to reuse them, and how much effort to invest in protecting personal data. The National Cybersecurity Alliance and CybSafe’s Oh, Behave! The Cybersecurity Attitudes and Behaviors Report: 2021–2025 follows those patterns over five years, drawing on responses from more than 24,000 adults and documenting how attitudes and behaviors shift over time. “Five years of data … More →

The post 5 years of shifting cybersecurity behavior appeared first on Help Net Security.

嗯，用户让我帮忙总结一篇文章，控制在一百个字以内，而且不需要特定的开头。首先，我需要仔细阅读文章内容，抓住主要信息。 文章讲的是Operation Epic Fury之后，伊朗相关威胁行为者可能进行网络反击。关键点包括他们针对关键基础设施和机会目标，涉及IRGC和MOIS等组织。建议修补已知漏洞，并准备好应对DDoS和僵尸网络活动。 接下来，我需要把这些要点浓缩到100字以内。要确保涵盖伊朗的反击行动、涉及的组织以及建议的措施。同时，语言要简洁明了。 可能的结构是：Operation Epic Fury后，伊朗威胁行为者可能反击关键基础设施和机会目标，涉及IRGC和MOIS等组织。建议修补漏洞并准备应对DDoS和僵尸网络活动。 检查字数是否在限制内，并确保信息准确传达。 Operation Epic Fury后，伊朗相关威胁行为者可能对关键基础设施和机会目标发起网络反击。涉及伊斯兰革命卫队(IRGC)和情报与安全部(MOIS)等组织。建议修复已知漏洞并准备应对DDoS和僵尸网络攻击。

嗯，用户让我总结一篇文章，控制在100字以内，而且不需要特定的开头。首先，我得通读文章内容，抓住主要信息。 文章讲的是Operation Epic Fury之后，伊朗相关威胁行为者可能会进行网络反击。他们可能攻击关键基础设施和机会目标。提到了几个伊朗相关的威胁组织，比如Altoufan Team和HANDALA。还建议修补已知漏洞，并准备应对DDoS和僵尸网络活动。 接下来，我需要把这些要点浓缩到100字以内。要确保涵盖主要事件、潜在攻击目标、涉及的组织以及建议的措施。 可能的结构是：事件背景、预期行动、涉及的组织、建议措施。这样既全面又简洁。 最后，检查字数是否符合要求，并确保语言流畅自然。 Operation Epic Fury后，伊朗相关威胁行为者可能对关键基础设施和机会目标发起网络反击。涉及组织包括IRGC和MOIS旗下团队如Altoufan Team和HANDALA。建议修复已知漏洞并防范DDoS及僵尸网络活动。

Following the joint military operation known as Operation Epic Fury, the Tenable Research Special Operations (RSO) team is providing an update regarding potential cyber counteroffensive operations conducted by Iran-linked threat actors.

Key takeaways:

1. Following Operation Epic Fury, Iran-linked threat actors are expected to launch counteroffensive operations against critical infrastructure and opportunistic targets.
    
2. Several Iranian-linked threat groups are affiliated with organizations including the IRGC and MOIS, including the revived Altoufan Team and HANDALA.
    
3. Review and patch the known vulnerabilities exploited by these threat actors and prepare for heightened DDoS and botnet activity in the near term.
    

Background

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, a series of military operations against Iran. As a result, Iran-linked threat actors are expected to launch cyber counteroffensive operations against the United States, Israel and other countries. Critical infrastructure providers as well as other opportunistic targets are likely at risk.

Analysis

Over the last several years, Iranian-nexus threat groups have shifted from stealthy espionage activity to destructive and retaliatory attacks as geopolitical tensions have risen. Wiper malware and ransomware attacks have ramped up in frequency and destructive capabilities as attackers have pivoted to targeting critical infrastructure, including those in Western countries.

Iranian Threat Actor Affiliations

Iranian state-sponsored cyber operations span across multiple groups, from advanced persistent threat (APT) actors to hacktivist fronts linked to both military and civilian agencies. These groups operate under, or maintain ties to, the following organizations:

• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Parallel military force separate from Iran's regular armed forces
• IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO): The intelligence arm within the IRGC, focused on surveillance and counterintelligence
• IRGC Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC): The IRGC's dedicated cyberwarfare unit
• Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS): Iran's civilian intelligence ministry, combining roles analogous to the CIA and FBI

GroupAliasesAffiliationOperational FocusBanished KittenVoid Manticore, Red Sandstorm, Storm-0842, DuneMOISConducts destructive operations under hacktivist-style personas including HomeLand Justice, Karma, and HANDALACyberAv3ngers-IRGC-CECTargets operational technology (OT) and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in water and wastewater systemsAPT34OilRig, Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm, Earth Simnavaz, COBALT GYPSY, Crambus, TA452, Evasive Serpens, ITG13MOISExploits internet-facing infrastructure to conduct espionage against energy, telecommunications and government targetsMuddyWaterMango Sandstorm, Static Kitten, Seedworm, Earth Vetala, MERCURY, TEMP.Zagros, TA450MOISUses legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to target telecommunications and government organizationsAPT42Damselfly, UNC788, Yellow Garuda, CharmingCypress, Educated Manticore, Mint Sandstorm*IRGC-IOHarvests credentials from journalists, academics, activists and policy researchers through social engineeringCotton SandstormHaywire Kitten, Marnanbridge, NEPTUNIUMIRGC-CECConducts hack-and-leak campaigns and influence operations under personas including Altoufan TeamAPT35Charming Kitten, Mint Sandstorm*, TA453, ITG18, Newscaster, COBALT ILLUSION, Agent SerpensIRGCConducts espionage campaigns targeting government, defense and energy organizationsPioneer KittenFox Kitten, Lemon Sandstorm, UNC757, Parisite, RUBIDIUM, Br0k3r, xplfinderIRGCExploits internet-facing devices and brokers access to ransomware affiliatesAgriusPink Sandstorm, Agonizing Serpens, AMERICIUM, BlackShadow, Spectral KittenMOISDeploys wiper malware disguised as ransomware against Israeli organizationsImperial KittenTortoiseshell, Crimson Sandstorm, TA456, Yellow Liderc, CURIUMIRGCUses social engineering to target Israeli transportation and logistics organizationsCyberToufan-UnknownTargets Israeli corporations with data theft and leak operations

* Note: Mint Sandstorm is a composite label spanning both APT35 and APT42

Recent reports of Iranian cyber-operations activity

Following the military operations on February 28, researchers have reported probing and staging activities linked to Iranian threat actors, including the revival of the ALTOUFAN TEAM persona tied to Cotton Sandstorm. There have been reports on social media from Iran government-linked hackers warning of “massive cyber attacks in the coming hours.” It’s unclear if successful attacks have taken place. Cyber-analysts should expect increased botnet and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) activity.

Ongoing monitoring

Tenable’s RSO continues to monitor for new intelligence on counteroffensive attacks by Iran-linked threat actors. We will publish updates as these developments are confirmed.

Identifying affected systems

Iranian threat actors have historically exploited known vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices and applications. A list of Tenable plugins for the vulnerabilities known to be associated with Iranian threat actors can be found here.

Get more information

• Frequently Asked Questions About Iranian Cyber Operations

Join Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) Team on Tenable Connect for further discussions on the latest cyber threats.

Learn more about Tenable One, the Exposure Management Platform for the modern attack surface.

Following the joint military operation known as Operation Epic Fury, the Tenable Research Special Operations (RSO) team is providing an update regarding potential cyber counteroffensive operations conducted by Iran-linked threat actors.

Key takeaways:

1. Following Operation Epic Fury, Iran-linked threat actors are expected to launch counteroffensive operations against critical infrastructure and opportunistic targets.
    
2. Several Iranian-linked threat groups are affiliated with organizations including the IRGC and MOIS, including the revived Altoufan Team and HANDALA.
    
3. Review and patch the known vulnerabilities exploited by these threat actors and prepare for heightened DDoS and botnet activity in the near term.
    

Background

On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched Operation Epic Fury, a series of military operations against Iran. As a result, Iran-linked threat actors are expected to launch cyber counteroffensive operations against the United States, Israel and other countries. Critical infrastructure providers as well as other opportunistic targets are likely at risk.

Analysis

Over the last several years, Iranian-nexus threat groups have shifted from stealthy espionage activity to destructive and retaliatory attacks as geopolitical tensions have risen. Wiper malware and ransomware attacks have ramped up in frequency and destructive capabilities as attackers have pivoted to targeting critical infrastructure, including those in Western countries.

Iranian Threat Actor Affiliations

Iranian state-sponsored cyber operations span across multiple groups, from advanced persistent threat (APT) actors to hacktivist fronts linked to both military and civilian agencies. These groups operate under, or maintain ties to, the following organizations:

• Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Parallel military force separate from Iran's regular armed forces
• IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRGC-IO): The intelligence arm within the IRGC, focused on surveillance and counterintelligence
• IRGC Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC): The IRGC's dedicated cyberwarfare unit
• Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS): Iran's civilian intelligence ministry, combining roles analogous to the CIA and FBI

Group Aliases Affiliation Operational Focus Banished Kitten Void Manticore, Red Sandstorm, Storm-0842, Dune MOIS Conducts destructive operations under hacktivist-style personas including HomeLand Justice, Karma, and HANDALA CyberAv3ngers - IRGC-CEC Targets operational technology (OT) and programmable logic controllers (PLCs) in water and wastewater systems APT34 OilRig, Helix Kitten, Hazel Sandstorm, Earth Simnavaz, COBALT GYPSY, Crambus, TA452, Evasive Serpens, ITG13 MOIS Exploits internet-facing infrastructure to conduct espionage against energy, telecommunications and government targets MuddyWater Mango Sandstorm, Static Kitten, Seedworm, Earth Vetala, MERCURY, TEMP.Zagros, TA450 MOIS Uses legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools to target telecommunications and government organizations APT42 Damselfly, UNC788, Yellow Garuda, CharmingCypress, Educated Manticore, Mint Sandstorm* IRGC-IO Harvests credentials from journalists, academics, activists and policy researchers through social engineering Cotton Sandstorm Haywire Kitten, Marnanbridge, NEPTUNIUM IRGC-CEC Conducts hack-and-leak campaigns and influence operations under personas including Altoufan Team APT35 Charming Kitten, Mint Sandstorm*, TA453, ITG18, Newscaster, COBALT ILLUSION, Agent Serpens IRGC Conducts espionage campaigns targeting government, defense and energy organizations Pioneer Kitten Fox Kitten, Lemon Sandstorm, UNC757, Parisite, RUBIDIUM, Br0k3r, xplfinder IRGC Exploits internet-facing devices and brokers access to ransomware affiliates Agrius Pink Sandstorm, Agonizing Serpens, AMERICIUM, BlackShadow, Spectral Kitten MOIS Deploys wiper malware disguised as ransomware against Israeli organizations Imperial Kitten Tortoiseshell, Crimson Sandstorm, TA456, Yellow Liderc, CURIUM IRGC Uses social engineering to target Israeli transportation and logistics organizations CyberToufan - Unknown Targets Israeli corporations with data theft and leak operations

* Note: Mint Sandstorm is a composite label spanning both APT35 and APT42

Recent reports of Iranian cyber-operations activity

Following the military operations on February 28, researchers have reported probing and staging activities linked to Iranian threat actors, including the revival of the ALTOUFAN TEAM persona tied to Cotton Sandstorm. There have been reports on social media from Iran government-linked hackers warning of “massive cyber attacks in the coming hours.” It’s unclear if successful attacks have taken place. Cyber-analysts should expect increased botnet and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) activity.

Ongoing monitoring

Tenable’s RSO continues to monitor for new intelligence on counteroffensive attacks by Iran-linked threat actors. We will publish updates as these developments are confirmed.

Identifying affected systems

Iranian threat actors have historically exploited known vulnerabilities in internet-facing devices and applications. A list of Tenable plugins for the vulnerabilities known to be associated with Iranian threat actors can be found here.

Get more information

• Frequently Asked Questions About Iranian Cyber Operations

Join Tenable's Research Special Operations (RSO) Team on Tenable Connect for further discussions on the latest cyber threats.

Learn more about Tenable One, the Exposure Management Platform for the modern attack surface.

The post Operation Epic Fury: Potential Iranian Cyber Counteroffensive Operations appeared first on Security Boulevard.

好，我现在需要帮用户总结一篇文章的内容，控制在100字以内。用户的要求很明确，不需要特定的开头，直接描述文章内容。 首先，我得通读整篇文章，抓住主要点。文章是作者阿小信的周记，记录了2026年2月16日至3月1日这两周的生活和工作情况。春节期间他去了乐山旅游，体验了各种景点和美食。回来后面对工作压力和职业焦虑，还遇到了家里发霉的问题，心态一度崩溃。最后他反思了知行合一的重要性，并决定继续坚持写周记。 接下来，我需要将这些要点浓缩到100字以内。要突出春节旅行、职业焦虑、发霉事件以及心态调整这几个关键点。 最后，确保语言简洁明了，不使用复杂的结构或专业术语。直接描述内容即可。 文章记录了作者2026年春节期间的生活与思考。春节期间他与家人前往乐山旅游，体验了当地景点与美食；返深后面对职业压力与经济焦虑；家中柜子发霉引发心态崩溃；最终反思知行合一的重要性，并决定继续坚持写周记记录生活。

嗯，用户让我总结一下这篇文章的内容，控制在一百个字以内，而且不需要特定的开头。首先，我得仔细阅读文章内容，抓住主要观点。 文章主要讲的是左右撇子在演化上的优势。右撇子在合作和模仿学习上更有优势，因为老师通常是右撇子。而左撇子在竞争和搏击中更有优势，因为他们比较少见，攻击时出其不意。 然后研究部分提到，在《Scientific Reports》上的研究测试了左撇子和竞争意识的关系。结果发现，右撇子越惯用右手，焦虑驱动的竞争回避倾向越强；左撇子则越惯用左手，自我发展型竞争倾向越强。 所以总结的时候要包括左右撇子的不同优势以及研究结果。控制在100字以内的话，可能需要简洁地表达这些点。 最后，确保语言流畅自然，不使用复杂的术语。这样用户就能快速理解文章的主要内容了。 文章指出左右手优势在演化中各有优劣：右撇子擅长合作与模仿学习，左撇子则在竞争和攻击中更具优势。研究发现右撇子更倾向于回避竞争，而左撇子则表现出更强的自我发展型竞争倾向。

人类中的大多数是右撇子，但还有 10.6% 的人是左撇子。演化心理学认为，右撇子和左撇子都有各自的演化上的优势。右撇子在部分合作行为上具有优势，如通过模仿进行学习，由于教师多数是右撇子，因此右撇子学习者可能更容易掌握新技能。左撇子被认为在竞争情景如搏击上有优势，由于左撇子比右撇子罕见得多，因此左撇子在攻击中能表现出更出其不意的效果。发表在《Scientific Reports》期刊上的一项研究测试了左撇子和竞争意识之间的关系。对 50 名左撇子志愿者和 483 名右撇子志愿者的分析发现：惯用右手程度越高，焦虑驱动的竞争回避倾向越强；惯用左手程度越高，自我发展型竞争倾向越强。

С какими инженерными трудностями столкнется самая амбициозная миссия NASA?

好的，我现在需要帮用户总结一篇文章的内容，控制在100字以内。首先，我得仔细阅读用户提供的文章内容，理解其主要信息。 文章讲的是星链移动服务的下一代卫星V2，它将提供5G速度，数据密度是V1的100倍。V2卫星能支持流媒体、互联网浏览、高速应用和语音通话，就像连接地面网络一样。星链移动服务之前叫Direct to Cell，已经覆盖32个国家，但现在受限于V1卫星只能支持轻量级数据和短信。升级后，用户峰值速度可达150Mbps。 接下来，我需要提取关键点：星链推出V2卫星，5G速度，数据密度提升百倍，支持更多功能，覆盖范围广但目前受限于V1，升级后速度提升到150Mbps。 然后要控制在100字以内，并且不需要特定的开头。所以可以这样组织语言： 星链宣布下一代卫星将提供5G速度，数据密度提升百倍。支持流媒体、互联网浏览等服务。已覆盖32国但受限于现有卫星。升级后峰值速度可达150Mbps。 检查一下字数是否符合要求，并确保信息准确无误。 星链宣布下一代卫星将提供5G速度，数据密度提升百倍。支持流媒体、互联网浏览等服务。已覆盖32国但受限于现有卫星。升级后峰值速度可达150Mbps。

好的，我现在需要帮用户总结一篇英文文章的内容，控制在100字以内，并且不需要特定的开头。首先，我得仔细阅读用户提供的内容，理解文章的主题和关键点。 看起来这篇文章主要介绍了一位资深软件工程师Maxi Contieri。他专注于Clean Code、设计和TDD（测试驱动开发）。他还写了一本书《Clean Code Cookbook》，并且已经发表了500多篇文章。此外，文章还提到了他的可信度以及他在软件工程管理和书籍出版方面的工作。 接下来，我需要将这些信息浓缩到100字以内。重点包括他的专业领域、书籍名称、发表的文章数量以及他的身份和成就。同时，要确保语言简洁明了，直接描述内容，不使用任何开头词。 最后，检查一下字数是否符合要求，并确保信息准确无误。这样用户就能得到一个清晰且简洁的总结。 Maxi Contieri, a senior software engineer specializing in Clean Code, Design, and TDD, authored the book "Clean Code Cookbook" and has written over 500 articles.

AI & Data Security Expert Ferrero | Italy | Hybrid – View job details As an AI & Data Security Expert, you will define and maintain security controls for AI solutions, ensuring compliance with evolving threats and regulations. You will advise on data protection, tool selection, and access controls, strengthen AI evaluation frameworks, and drive security awareness and continuous improvement across the organization. Application Security Engineer, VP State Street | United Kingdom | On-site – … More →

The post Cybersecurity jobs available right now: March 3, 2026 appeared first on Help Net Security.

Fired Employee Illegally Downloaded 1M Patient Records
A former Nuance Communications IT worker has pleaded guilty in a criminal case that alleged he downloaded and stored on a personal hard drive containing 1.2 million patient records of a client, Geisinger Health, two days after he was terminated from his job in 2023.