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The author of a new study told CyberScoop he's "very worried,” describing deanonymization capabilities of AI as a “large scale invasion of privacy.”
The post LLMs are getting better at unmasking people online appeared first on CyberScoop.
3 min readLegal AI solutions provider LexisNexis has confirmed a massive breach of its AWS environment According to reports, initial access was gained by exploiting the “React2Shell” vulnerability in an unpatched React frontend application – a flaw the company had reportedly left unaddressed for months. Among the details reportedly posted by the attacker is the claim that, […]
The post How a Single Overprivileged Service Turned the LexisNexis Breach Into a Keys-to-the-Kingdom Moment appeared first on Aembit.
The post How a Single Overprivileged Service Turned the LexisNexis Breach Into a Keys-to-the-Kingdom Moment appeared first on Security Boulevard.
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Your SOC can't triage every alert — the math proves it. See why 75% of alerts go uninvestigated and how AI-autonomous triage closes the gap.
The post 6 Minutes and a Prayer: The Math Your SOC Doesn’t Want You to See appeared first on D3 Security.
The post 6 Minutes and a Prayer: The Math Your SOC Doesn’t Want You to See appeared first on Security Boulevard.
Session 14D: Autonomous Vehicles
Authors, Creators & Presenters: Ningfei Wang (University of California, Irvine), Shaoyuan Xie (University of California, Irvine), Takami Sato (University of California, Irvine), Yunpeng Luo (University of California, Irvine), Kaidi Xu (Drexel University), Qi Alfred Chen (University of California, Irvine)
PAPER
Revisiting Physical-World Adversarial Attack On Traffic Sign Recognition: A Commercial Systems Perspective
Traffic Sign Recognition (TSR) is crucial for safe and correct driving automation. Recent works revealed a general vulnerability of TSR models to physical-world adversarial attacks, which can be low-cost, highly deployable, and capable of causing severe attack effects such as hiding a critical traffic sign or spoofing a fake one. However, so far existing works generally only considered evaluating the attack effects on academic TSR models, leaving the impacts of such attacks on real-world commercial TSR systems largely unclear. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale measurement of physical-world adversarial attacks against commercial TSR systems. Our testing results reveal that it is possible for existing attack works from academia to have highly reliable (100%) attack success against certain commercial TSR system functionality, but such attack capabilities are not generalizable, leading to much lower-than-expected attack success rates overall. We find that one potential major factor is a spatial memorization design that commonly exists in today's commercial TSR systems. We design new attack success metrics that can mathematically model the impacts of such design on the TSR system-level attack success, and use them to revisit existing attacks. Through these efforts, we uncover 7 novel observations, some of which directly challenge the observations or claims in prior works due to the introduction of the new metrics.
ABOUT NDSS
The Network and Distributed System Security Symposium (NDSS) fosters information exchange among researchers and practitioners of network and distributed system security. The target audience includes those interested in practical aspects of network and distributed system security, with a focus on actual system design and implementation. A major goal is to encourage and enable the Internet community to apply, deploy, and advance the state of available security technologies.
Our thanks to the Network and Distributed System Security (NDSS) Symposium for publishing their Creators, Authors and Presenter’s superb NDSS Symposium 2025 Conference content on the Organizations' YouTube Channel.
The post NDSS 2025 – On The Realism Of LiDAR Spoofing Attacks Against Autonomous Driving Vehicle appeared first on Security Boulevard.
The software that moves money, processes trades, and manages accounts is among the most scrutinized code on earth. Yet even in highly regulated financial environments, a vulnerability persists that traditional perimeter security cannot address: the integrity of the code itself between development and deployment. Jamshir Qureshi, a Vice President at Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, USA,..
The post The Verification Imperative: How One Framework Is Reshaping Trust in Financial Code appeared first on Security Boulevard.