Aggregator

The cybersecurity community on Reddit responded in disbelief this month when a self-described Air National Guard member with top secret security clearance began questioning the arrangement they'd made with company called DSLRoot, which was paying $250 a month to plug a pair of laptops into the Redditor's high-speed Internet connection in the United States. This post examines the history and provenance of DSLRoot, one of the oldest "residential proxy" networks with origins in Russia and Eastern Europe.

Набор правил, превращающих проверку в надёжный барьер.

Cloudflare MCP Server Portals are now available in Open Beta. MCP Server Portals are a new capability that enable you to centralize, secure, and observe every MCP connection in your organization.

Aembit, the workload identity and access management (IAM) company, today announced new capabilities for GitLab designed to reduce the security risks of long-lived personal access tokens (PATs) and other secrets needed to automate software delivery, while making it easier to deploy and manage pipelines. With the introduction of Credential Lifecycle Management and the availability of […]

The post Aembit Extends Secretless CI/CD with Credential Lifecycle Management for GitLab appeared first on Cyber Security News.

On the day AWS Kiro was released, I couldn’t resist putting it through some of my Month of AI Bugs security tests for coding agents. AWS Kiro was vulnerable to arbitrary command execution via indirect prompt injection. This means that a remote attacker, who controls data that Kiro processes, could hijack it to run arbitrary operating system commands or write and run custom code. In particular two attack paths that enabled this with AWS Kiro were identified:

Discover how GDPR compliance can spark real growth and give you a competitive advantage with practical strategies and a strong security culture. [...]

Until businesses begin to account for uncontrolled variables in their threat models, attackers will continue to exploit the weakest link in the chain.

Written by: Austin Larsen, Matt Lin, Tyler McLellan, Omar ElAhdan

Update (August 28)

Based on new information identified by GTIG, the scope of this compromise is not exclusive to the Salesforce integration with Salesloft Drift and impacts other integrations. We now advise all Salesloft Drift customers to treat any and all authentication tokens stored in or connected to the Drift platform as potentially compromised.

On August 28, 2025, our investigation confirmed that the actor also compromised OAuth tokens for the "Drift Email" integration. On August 9, 2025, a threat actor used these tokens to access email from a very small number of Google Workspace accounts. The only accounts that were potentially accessed were those that had been specifically configured to integrate with Salesloft Drift; the actor would not have been able to access any other accounts on a customer's Workspace domain.

In response to these findings and to protect our customers, Google identified the impacted users, revoked the specific OAuth tokens granted to the Drift Email application, and disabled the integration functionality between Google Workspace and Salesloft Drift pending further investigation. We are notifying all impacted Google Workspace administrators.

To be clear, there has been no compromise of Google Workspace or Alphabet itself. Google has not been a Salesloft Drift customer, and therefore is not impacted. Any inquiries regarding potential breach impact should be directed to Salesloft or its customers.

We recommend organizations take immediate action to review all third-party integrations connected to their Drift instance, revoke and rotate credentials for those applications, and investigate all connected systems for signs of unauthorized access. 

Salesloft has now engaged Mandiant to assist in their investigation. See Salesloft’s updated advisory for more details.

Introduction 

Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) is issuing an advisory to alert organizations about a widespread data theft campaign, carried out by the actor tracked as UNC6395. Beginning as early as Aug. 8, 2025 through at least Aug. 18, 2025, the actor targeted Salesforce customer instances through compromised OAuth tokens associated with the Salesloft Drift third-party application.

The actor systematically exported large volumes of data from numerous corporate Salesforce instances. GTIG assesses the primary intent of the threat actor is to harvest credentials. After the data was exfiltrated, the actor searched through the data to look for secrets that could be potentially used to compromise victim environments. GTIG observed UNC6395 targeting sensitive credentials such as Amazon Web Services (AWS) access keys (AKIA), passwords, and Snowflake-related access tokens. UNC6395 demonstrated operational security awareness by deleting query jobs, however logs were not impacted and organizations should still review relevant logs for evidence of data exposure.

Based on data available at the time, Salesloft indicated that customers that do not integrate with Salesforce are not impacted by this campaign.

On Aug. 20, 2025 Salesloft, in collaboration with Salesforce, revoked all active access and refresh tokens with the Drift application. In addition, Salesforce removed the Drift application from the Salesforce AppExchange until further notice pending further investigation. This issue does not stem from a vulnerability within the core Salesforce platform.

GTIG, Salesforce, and Salesloft have notified impacted organizations.

Threat Detail 

The threat actor executed queries to retrieve information associated with Salesforce objects such as Cases, Accounts, Users, and Opportunities. For example, the threat actor ran the following sequence of queries to get a unique count from each of the associated Salesforce objects.

SELECT COUNT() FROM Account; SELECT COUNT() FROM Opportunity; SELECT COUNT() FROM User; SELECT COUNT() FROM Case; Query to Retrieve User Data SELECT Id, Username, Email, FirstName, LastName, Name, Title, CompanyName, Department, Division, Phone, MobilePhone, IsActive, LastLoginDate, CreatedDate, LastModifiedDate, TimeZoneSidKey, LocaleSidKey, LanguageLocaleKey, EmailEncodingKey FROM User WHERE IsActive = true ORDER BY LastLoginDate DESC NULLS LAST LIMIT 20 Query to Retrieve Case Data SELECT Id, IsDeleted, MasterRecordId, CaseNumber <snip> FROM Case LIMIT 10000 Recommendations

Given GTIG's observations of data exfiltration associated with the campaign, organizations using Salesloft Drift to integrate with third-party platforms (including but not limited to Salesforce) should consider their data compromised and are urged to take immediate remediation steps.

Impacted organizations should search for sensitive information and secrets contained within the integrated platforms and take appropriate action, such as revoking API keys, rotating credentials, and performing further investigation to determine if the secrets were abused by the threat actor.

Investigate for Compromise and Scan for Exposed Secrets

• Review all third-party integrations associated with an organization's Drift instance (accessible within the Drift Admin settings page).

• Within each integrated third-party application, search for the IP addresses and User-Agent strings provided in the IOCs section below. While this list includes IPs from the Tor network that have been observed to date, Mandiant recommends a broader search for any activity originating from Tor exit nodes.

• Review Salesforce Event Monitoring logs for unusual activity associated with the Drift connection user.

• Review authentication activity from the Drift Connected App.

• Review UniqueQuery events that log executed SOQL queries.

• Open a Salesforce support case to obtain specific queries used by the threat actor.

• Search Salesforce objects for potential secrets, such as:

• AKIA for long-term AWS access key identifiers

• Snowflake or snowflakecomputing.com for Snowflake credentials

• password, secret,key to find potential references to credential material

• Strings related to organization-specific login URLs, such as VPN or SSO login pages

• Run tools like Trufflehog to find secrets and hardcoded credentials.

Revoke and Rotate Credentials

• Within each integrated third-party application, revoke and rotate API keys, credentials. and authentication tokens associated with third-party application integrations with a Drift instance.

• Immediately revoke and rotate any discovered keys or secrets.

• Reset passwords for associated user accounts.

• For Salesforce integrations, configure session timeout values in Session Settings to limit the lifespan of a compromised session.

Harden Access Controls

• Review and Restrict Connected App Scopes: Ensure that applications have the minimum necessary permissions and avoid overly permissive scopes like full access.

• Enforce IP Restrictions on the Connected App: In the app's settings, set the "IP Relaxation" policy to "Enforce IP restrictions."

• Define Login IP Ranges: On user profiles, define IP ranges to only allow access from trusted networks.

• Remove the "API Enabled" Permission: Remove the "API Enabled" permission from profiles and grant it only to authorized users via a Permission Set.

Additional instructions and updates are available on the Salesloft Trust Center and Salesforce advisory. 

Acknowledgments 

We would like to thank Salesforce, Salesloft, and other trusted partners for their collaboration and assistance in responding to this threat.

IOCs 

The following indicators of compromise are available in a Google Threat Intelligence (GTI) collection for registered users.

Indicator Value

Description

Salesforce-Multi-Org-Fetcher/1.0

Malicious User-Agent string

Salesforce-CLI/1.0

Malicious User-Agent string

python-requests/2.32.4

User-Agent string

Python/3.11 aiohttp/3.12.15

User-Agent string

208.68.36.90

DigitalOcean

44.215.108.109

Amazon Web Services

154.41.95.2

Tor exit node

176.65.149.100

Tor exit node

179.43.159.198

Tor exit node

185.130.47.58

Tor exit node

185.207.107.130

Tor exit node

185.220.101.133

Tor exit node

185.220.101.143

Tor exit node

185.220.101.164

Tor exit node

185.220.101.167

Tor exit node

185.220.101.169

Tor exit node

185.220.101.180

Tor exit node

185.220.101.185

Tor exit node

185.220.101.33

Tor exit node

192.42.116.179

Tor exit node

192.42.116.20

Tor exit node

194.15.36.117

Tor exit node

195.47.238.178

Tor exit node

195.47.238.83

Tor exit node

This guide provides best practices for Security and IT leaders to securely adopt generative AI using Cloudflare’s SASE architecture as part of a strategy for AI Security Posture Management (AI-SPM).

Cloudflare's AI security suite now includes unsafe content moderation, integrated into the Application Security Suite via Firewall for AI.

Cloudflare CASB now scans ChatGPT, Claude, and Gemini for misconfigurations, sensitive data exposure, and compliance issues, helping organizations adopt AI with confidence.

Cloudflare will provide confidence scores within our application library for Gen AI applications, allowing customers to assess their risk for employees using shadow IT.

A vulnerability was found in LifePress Plugin up to 2.1.3 on WordPress and classified as critical. The impacted element is an unknown function. Such manipulation leads to missing authorization. This vulnerability is documented as CVE-2025-53337. The attack can be executed remotely. There is not any exploit available.

A vulnerability has been found in Kalium Plugin up to 3.18.3 on WordPress and classified as critical. The affected element is an unknown function. This manipulation causes missing authorization. This vulnerability is registered as CVE-2025-53348. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. No exploit is available.

A vulnerability, which was classified as very critical, was found in MitraStar GPT-2741GNAC-N2. Impacted is an unknown function of the component SSH. The manipulation results in privilege escalation. This vulnerability is cataloged as CVE-2025-50753. The attack may be launched remotely. There is no exploit available.

SpyCloud released the Consumer IDLink solution, designed to help financial institutions and other consumer-facing organizations reduce risk and prevent fraud stemming from consumer identity exposures. Consumer IDLink, delivered via API, uses SpyCloud’s proprietary identity matching analytics to unify fragmented identity exposures – from third-party breaches, infostealer malware infections, and successful phishing attacks – into holistic identities, giving fraud prevention and risk management teams correlated views they can act on automatically. Unlike traditional compromised credential checking … More →

The post SpyCloud Consumer IDLink unifies fragmented identity exposures appeared first on Help Net Security.

A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in Citrix NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway up to 37.240/47.47/55.329/59.21. This issue affects some unknown processing of the component Management Interface. The manipulation leads to improper validation of specified quantity in input. This vulnerability is listed as CVE-2025-8424. The attack must be carried out from within the local network. There is no available exploit. It is advisable to upgrade the affected component.

A vulnerability classified as critical was found in Cursor 15.4.1 on macOS. This vulnerability affects unknown code of the component Configuration Handler. Executing manipulation can lead to incorrect default permissions. This vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2025-9190. The attack is restricted to local execution. No exploit exists.

A vulnerability classified as critical has been found in Nozbe on macOS. This affects an unknown part of the component Configuration Handler. Performing manipulation results in incorrect default permissions. This vulnerability is identified as CVE-2025-53813. The attack is only possible with local access. There is not any exploit available. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component.

A vulnerability described as critical has been identified in Mosh-Pro 1.3.2 on macOS. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality. Such manipulation leads to incorrect default permissions. This vulnerability is referenced as CVE-2025-53811. The attack can only be performed from a local environment. No exploit is available.