Aggregator
CVE-2025-21704 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.128/6.6.78/6.12.15/6.13.3/6.14-rc2 USB /dev/ttyACM* acm_ctrl_irq memory corruption (Nessus ID 233595)
CVE-2025-21707 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.128/6.6.75/6.12.12/6.13.1 __mptcp_expand_seq initialization (Nessus ID 233595)
CVE-2025-21684 | Linux Kernel up to 6.6.73/6.12.10 xilinx gpio_lock stack-based overflow (Nessus ID 233595)
CVE-2025-21701 | Linux Kernel up to 6.6.75/6.12.12/6.13.1 kernel/locking/mutex.c information disclosure (Nessus ID 233595)
CVE-2024-58016 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.128/6.6.77/6.12.13/6.13.2 safesetid handle_policy_update buffer overflow (Nessus ID 233595)
CVE-2024-58020 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.128/6.6.78/6.12.15/6.13.3/6.14-rc2 multitouch devm_kasprintf null pointer dereference (Nessus ID 233595)
CVE-2024-58034 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.128/6.6.75/6.12.12/6.13.1 tegra20-emc tegra_emc_find_node_by_ram_code device use after free (Nessus ID 233595)
CVE-2024-58009 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.128/6.6.77/6.12.13/6.13.2 l2cap_sock_alloc initialization (Nessus ID 233595)
CVE-2024-58010 | Linux Kernel up to 6.1.128/6.6.77/6.12.13/6.13.2 binfmt_flat full_data integer overflow (Nessus ID 233595)
Capture Point 5353 3.0
Date: March 30, 2025, 6 p.m. — 01 April 2025, 08:10 UTC [add to calendar]
Format: Jeopardy
On-line
Offical URL: https://iiitv.capturepoint5353.tech/
Rating weight: 22.20
Event organizers: HORIZON_03
DPRK IT Workers Expanding in Scope and Scale
Written by: Jamie Collier
Since our September 2024 report outlining the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) IT worker threat, the scope and scale of their operations has continued to expand. These individuals pose as legitimate remote workers to infiltrate companies and generate revenue for the regime. This places organizations that hire DPRK IT workers at risk of espionage, data theft, and disruption.
In collaboration with partners, Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) has identified an increase of active operations in Europe, confirming the threat's expansion beyond the United States. This growth is coupled with evolving tactics, such as intensified extortion campaigns and the move to conduct operations within corporate virtualized infrastructure.
On The March: IT Workers Expand Globally with a Focus on EuropeDPRK IT workers' activity across multiple countries now establishes them as a global threat. While the United States remains a key target, over the past months, DPRK IT workers have encountered challenges in seeking and maintaining employment in the country. This is likely due to increased awareness of the threat through public reporting, United States Department of Justice indictments, and right-to-work verification challenges. These factors have instigated a global expansion of IT worker operations, with a notable focus on Europe.
Figure 1: List of countries impacted by DPRK IT workers
IT Worker Activity in EuropeIn late 2024, one DPRK IT worker operated at least 12 personas across Europe and the United States. The IT Worker actively sought employment with multiple organizations within Europe, particularly those within the defense industrial base and government sectors. This individual demonstrated a pattern of providing fabricated references, building a rapport with job recruiters, and using additional personas they controlled to vouch for their credibility.
Separately, additional investigations uncovered other IT worker personas seeking employment in Germany and Portugal, alongside login credentials for user accounts of European job websites and human capital management platforms.
GTIG has also observed a diverse portfolio of projects in the United Kingdom undertaken by DPRK IT workers. These projects included web development, bot development, content management system (CMS) development, and blockchain technology, indicating a broad range of technical expertise, spanning traditional web development to advanced blockchain and AI applications.
Specific projects identified include:
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Development of a Nodexa token hosting plan platform using Next.js, React, CosmosSDK, and Golang, as well as the creation of a job marketplace using Next.js, Tailwind CSS, MongoDB, and Node.js.
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Further blockchain-related projects involved Solana and Anchor/Rust smart contract development, and a blockchain job marketplace built using the MERN stack and Solana.
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Contributions to existing websites by adding pages using Next.js and Tailwind CSS,
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Development of an artificial intelligence (AI) web application leveraging Electron, Next.js, AI, and blockchain technologies.
In their efforts to secure these positions, DPRK IT workers employed deceptive tactics, falsely claiming nationalities from a diverse set of countries, including Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Ukraine, the United States, and Vietnam. The identities used were a combination of real and fabricated personas.
IT workers in Europe were recruited through various online platforms, including Upwork, Telegram, and Freelancer. Payment for their services was facilitated through cryptocurrency, the TransferWise service, and Payoneer, highlighting the use of methods that obfuscate the origin and destination of funds.
Facilitators Support European OperationsThe facilitators used by IT workers to help them get jobs, defeat identity verification, and receive funds fraudulently have also been found in Europe. One incident involved a DPRK IT worker using facilitators located in both the United States and the United Kingdom. Notably, a corporate laptop, ostensibly intended for use in New York, was found to be operational in London, indicating a complex logistical chain.
An investigation into infrastructure used by a suspected facilitator also highlighted heightened interest in Europe. Resources discovered contained fabricated personas, including resumes listing degrees from Belgrade University in Serbia and residences in Slovakia, as well as instructions for navigating European job sites. Additionally, contact information for a broker specializing in false passports was discovered, indicating a coordinated effort to acquire fraudulent identification documents. One document provided specific guidance on seeking employment in Serbia, including the use of a Serbian time zone during communications.
Extortion Heating UpAlongside global expansion, DPRK IT workers are also evolving their tactics. Based on data from multiple sources, GTIG assesses that since late October 2024, IT workers have increased the volume of extortion attempts and gone after larger organizations.
In these incidents, recently fired IT workers threatened to release their former employers’ sensitive data or to provide it to a competitor. This data included proprietary data and source code for internal projects.
The increase in extortion campaigns coincided with heightened United States law enforcement actions against DPRK IT workers, including disruptions and indictments. This suggests a potential link, where pressure on these workers may be driving them to adopt more aggressive measures to maintain their revenue stream.
Previously, workers terminated from their places of employment might attempt to provide references for their other personas so that they could be rehired by the company. It is possible that the workers suspected they were terminated due to discovery of their true identities, which would preclude attempts to be rehired.
The Virtual Workspace: BYOD Brings IT Worker RisksTo avoid distributing corporate laptops, some companies operate a bring your own device (BYOD) policy, allowing employees to access company systems through virtual machines. Unlike corporate laptops that can be monitored, personal devices operating under a BYOD policy may lack traditional security and logging tools, making it difficult to track activities and identify potential threats. This absence of conventional security measures means that typical evidence trails linked to IT workers, such as those derived from corporate laptop shipping addresses and endpoint software inventories, are unavailable. All of this increases the risk of undetected malicious activity.
GTIG believes that IT workers have identified BYOD environments as potentially ripe for their schemes, and in January 2025, IT workers are now conducting operations against their employers in these scenarios.
ConclusionGlobal expansion, extortion tactics, and the use of virtualized infrastructure all highlight the adaptable strategies employed by DPRK IT workers. In response to heightened awareness of the threat within the United States, they've established a global ecosystem of fraudulent personas to enhance operational agility. Coupled with the discovery of facilitators in the UK, this suggests the rapid formation of a global infrastructure and support network that empowers their continued operations.
For detailed mitigation and detection strategies, please read our previous report on DPRK IT workers. For even more details, read our IT worker Transform post.
CISA Adds One Known Exploited Vulnerability to Catalog
CISA has added one new vulnerability to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation.
- CVE-2025-24813 Apache Tomcat Path Equivalence Vulnerability
These types of vulnerabilities are frequent attack vectors for malicious cyber actors and pose significant risks to the federal enterprise.
Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Reducing the Significant Risk of Known Exploited Vulnerabilities established the Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog as a living list of known Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) that carry significant risk to the federal enterprise. BOD 22-01 requires Federal Civilian Executive Branch (FCEB) agencies to remediate identified vulnerabilities by the due date to protect FCEB networks against active threats. See the BOD 22-01 Fact Sheet for more information.
Although BOD 22-01 only applies to FCEB agencies, CISA strongly urges all organizations to reduce their exposure to cyberattacks by prioritizing timely remediation of Catalog vulnerabilities as part of their vulnerability management practice. CISA will continue to add vulnerabilities to the catalog that meet the specified criteria.
CISA Releases Two Industrial Control Systems Advisories
CISA released two Industrial Control Systems (ICS) advisories on April 1, 2025. These advisories provide timely information about current security issues, vulnerabilities, and exploits surrounding ICS.
- ICSA-25-091-01 Rockwell Automation Lifecycle Services with Veeam Backup and Replication
- ICSA-24-331-04 Hitachi Energy MicroSCADA Pro/X SYS600 (Update A)
CISA encourages users and administrators to review newly released ICS advisories for technical details and mitigations.
OpenSSF guidelines encourage OSS developers to build securely
Developers have always had a conflicted relationship with security. While they don't want to produce software with security flaws, they don't want to be security experts either. With that in mind, the Open Source Security Foundation (OpenSSF) has released the Open Source Project Security Baseline.
The post OpenSSF guidelines encourage OSS developers to build securely appeared first on Security Boulevard.
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Kentico Xperience CMS XSS Vulnerability Allows Remote Code Execution
Kentico Xperience CMS, a widely used platform designed for enterprises and organizations, is under scrutiny after a vulnerability chain was discovered that exploits Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) to enable Remote Code Execution (RCE). This vulnerability was disclosed by researchers who demonstrated its potential harm through a detailed proof of concept. CVE-2025-2748: Cross-Site Scripting Vulnerability According to […]
The post Kentico Xperience CMS XSS Vulnerability Allows Remote Code Execution appeared first on GBHackers Security | #1 Globally Trusted Cyber Security News Platform.
Product Update: Automate alerts to your social media
Escape has created the first ever push-to-post automation to revolutionize vulnerability management by giving you the recognition you deserve.
The post Product Update: Automate alerts to your social media appeared first on Security Boulevard.