Aggregator
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Juniper PTX Routers at Risk, Critical Takeover Flaw Disclosed
A critical vulnerability in Juniper Networks' primary operating system could give threat actors root level privileges to execute code on Juniper’s PTX Series routers. Successful exploitation would give attackers full command and control over devices without the need for authentication.
观测数据显示伊朗互联网流量(国际)跌至0.1% 已持续断网超过72小时
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重磅发布:熬🦞成功!!用200美刀和200小时的经验告诉你如何成功养成一只高阶Openclaw。附三个基础设施级别的技能。
Gunra
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Gunra
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Audible推出更便宜的“标准”订阅套餐
[实验性] 有开发者破解苹果ANE神经网络引擎 原来M4芯片也能直接训练小模型
INC
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Metaencryptor
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伪装成钉钉安装程序银狐最新攻击样本与威胁情报
The DocuSign Email That Wasn’t – A Three-Redirect Credential Harvest
The DocuSign Email That Wasn’t – A Three-Redirect Credential Harvest
Credential Harvesting
Brand Impersonation
MITRE: T1566.002
MITRE: T1598.003
The "Review & Sign" button looked exactly like every DocuSign notification you've ever received. Same blue branding, same layout, same urgency. But the button didn't point to DocuSign. It pointed to Google Maps > then to Amazon S3 > then to a credential harvesting page that looked close enough to a Microsoft login to fool anyone moving fast.
A Redirect Chain Built to Dodge ScannersThe email arrived at a mid-size financial services firm on a Monday morning, formatted as a forwarded legal document awaiting signature. The body included realistic law-firm footers, a bank reference, and multiple legitimate links — all designed to make the one malicious link blend in.
That malicious link: a maps[.]google[.]be redirect that resolved to a public S3 bucket hosting an HTML page at bucket-secure-cdn-cdn-media-static[.]s3[.]us-east-1[.]amazonaws[.]com/about[.]html. The page mimicked a Microsoft 365 login.
The redirect chain is the whole game here. URL scanners check the first domain, Google, and stop. The S3 destination isn't evaluated until someone clicks, and by then, the scanner has already marked it safe.
Attack Flow DocuSign Lure Email→
Google Maps Redirect
→
Amazon S3 HTML Page
→
Credential Harvest
See Your Risk: Calculate how many threats like this your gateway is missing
Why the Gateway Gave It a PassEmail authentication didn't help. SPF passed, the sending server was legitimately authorized by the envelope domain, a small Japanese web services company with no connection to DocuSign. No DKIM signature. DMARC returned a best-guess pass.
So the email arrived with clean authentication, a trusted redirect domain (Google), and a hosting provider (AWS) that no blocklist is going to flag broadly. The attacker's infrastructure looked legitimate at every checkpoint.
Check Result Why It Didn't Help SPF Pass ✓ Sending server was authorized - by the wrong domain DKIM None No signature to validate DMARC Best-guess Pass No DMARC record - receiver inferred "pass" URL Scan Safe ✓ Only scanned first hop (Google domain)IRONSCALES Adaptive AI caught what the static checks missed: the behavioral mismatch between the sender's domain infrastructure (a Japanese web hosting provider) and the claimed identity (DocuSign). Combined with community-reported patterns matching the same S3 bucket across three other organizations, the platform quarantined the message within 90 seconds of delivery, before any recipient clicked.
Your TakeawayIf your email security relies on URL reputation at the first hop, redirect-chain attacks will sail through. Ask your security team: does our scanning follow redirects to the final destination? If the answer is "sometimes" or "I'm not sure" - that's the gap attackers are counting on.
Get a Demo: See how IRONSCALES detects redirect-chain phishing in real time
The post The DocuSign Email That Wasn’t – A Three-Redirect Credential Harvest appeared first on Security Boulevard.